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1. No SOLICITATION CLAUSES
In the fall of 1999, the Court of Chancery issued three decisions relating
to strict no solicitation clauses in stock-for-stock merger agreements that
limited the ability of a board of directors to engage in negotiations with or
provide information to a third-party bidder. In a later decision, the Court
upheld the use of a no-shop provision coupled with other lock-up devices
under the businessjudgment rule, because the lock-up mechanisms were not
employed as a defensive response to a perceived threat from a potential
acquirer making a competing bid.
In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.,' Phelps Dodge
Corporation sought a preliminary injunction against implementation ofa no
solicitation clause in a stock-for-stock merger agreement that prohibited the
I Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., CA No. 17398, 17383, 17427, Chandler,
C. (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (bench ruling).
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merger partners not only from soliciting alternative bids, but also from
engaging in discussions of any kind with a third-party bidder until the
merger agreement was terminated. Phelps Dodge argued that this provision
prevented the boards of directors of the merging companies from fulfilling
their duty of care in deciding whether to recommend the merger to their
stockholders, because the boards could not gather the information about
third-party bids that they needed to make their decisions. Phelps Dodge also
challenged as unreasonable the termination fee in the merger agreement,
which represented approximately 6.3% of the market capitalization of one of
the merging parties.
Although the Court denied the motion for preliminary injunction after
finding that Phelps Dodge had not shown irreparable harm, the Court found
that Phelps Dodge had established a probability of success on the merits.
First, the Court noted that although parties to a stock-for-stock merger of
equals have no obligation to negotiate with unsolicited bidders, the decision
not to negotiate must be an informed one. The Court found that the strict
no-talk provision with no fiduciary out, short of terminating the agreement,
imposed "the legal equivalent of willful blindness, a blindness that may
constitute a breach of a board's duty of care; that is, the duty to take care to
be informed of all material information reasonably available."2 Second, the
Court found that the 6.3% termination fee "probably stretches the definition
[of reasonableness] beyond its breaking point."3
In Ace Limited v. Capital Re Corp., Ace sought to temporarily restrain
Capital Re from terminating its stock-for-stock merger agreement with Ace
(which Capital Re's board of directors wanted to do in order to accept an
offer from a third party), and otherwise enforce a no solicitation clause in the
merger agreement.4 The clause permitted Capital Re to engage in discus-
sions with, and provide information to, third-party bidders without
terminating the agreement, only if the board concluded, "based on the written
advice of its outside legal counsel," that engaging in discussions or providing
information was "required in order to prevent the [b]oard . . . from
breaching its fiduciary duties to its stockholders under [Delaware law]." 5
Capital Re had engaged in negotiations with a third party which resulted in
a proposal that the Capital Re board determined was superior to the
Ace/Capital Re merger agreement, but did not obtain written advice from its
legal counsel stating that the negotiations were required. Ace argued that
such written advice was required by the merger agreement, that Capital Re
2 Id. at5.
3 Id.
4 Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
5 Id. at 98-99.
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had breached the merger agreement by failing to obtain the advice prior to
entering into negotiations, and that as a result Capital Re was not entitled to
terminate the merger agreement, which by its terms could not be terminated
by a party in material breach of the agreement.
It is noteworthy that Ace held 12.3% of Capital Re's stock and had
entered into voting agreements with holders of 33.5% of Capital Re's stock
requiring the stockholders to support the Ace/Capital Re merger if the
Capital Re board did not terminate the merger agreement in accordance with
its terms. Thus, Ace would control nearly 46% of the vote on the merger
agreement, which the Court concluded virtually guaranteed approval of the
merger agreement, unless the Capital Re board terminated it.
The Court found that Ace had failed to establish a likelihood of success
on the merits (under the circumstances of the case the Court gave more
weight to the merits than is traditionally the case on a motion for TRO) and
denied the motion for temporary restraining order. The Court noted that
Ace's position depended on a literal reading of the no solicitation clause,
under which the Capital Re board could not negotiate unless it obtained a
specific opinion from counsel. In the Court's view, such a requirement
would "involve... an abdication by the board of its duty to determine what
its own fiduciary obligations require."6 The Court also noted that if indeed
there was no fiduciary duty to negotiate with third-party bidders in the
context of a stock-for-stock "merger of equals," the fiduciary out in the no
solicitation clause was illusory. The Court explained that a no solicitation
provision that lacked a fiduciary out would be "particularly suspect when a
failure to consider other offers guarantees the consummation of the original
transaction, however more valuable an alternative transaction may be and
however less valuable the original transaction may have become since the
merger agreement was signed."' The Court observed that such a provision
might be permissible if the stockholders could freely vote for or against the
existing stock-for-stock merger and thus choose between that merger, a
subsequent proposal, or no merger at all. The Court also suggested that such
a provision might be acceptable if the board agreed to the provision as an
auction-ending measure after a thorough canvass of the market.
The Ace decision also is noteworthy because the Court discussed
extensively a theoretical framework for setting aside contract provisions
approved by boards of directors in violation of their fiduciary duties. While
noting the tension between a vested contract right and the fiduciary doctrine
articulated most fully in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
6 Id. at 106.
7 Id.
2002]
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Inc.,' the Court concluded that the following factors are to be considered
when deciding if a contract right must give way: 1) if "the acquirer knew, or
should have known, of the target board's breach of fiduciary duty," 2) if the
"transaction remains pending," making the parties' contractual expectations
less settled, and 3) if "the board's violation of fiduciary duty relates to policy
concerns that are especially significant."9
In In re JXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, a stockholder of
IXC Communications, Inc. challenged a strict no solicitation clause, which,
like the Phelps Dodge clause, barred any discussions with third-party bidders
unless the merger agreement was terminated.'0 Before agreeing to this
provision, however, IXC had announced publicly that it was exploring
strategic alternatives and conducted a thorough canvass of the market for
potential strategic partners. In addition, after the Phelps Dodge ruling, the
parties amended the merger agreement to permit discussions with third-party
bidders. In reliance on Phelps Dodge, the plaintiff argued the no solicitation
clause nevertheless had tainted the sale process, and that the board had
"willfully blinded" itself by approving the provision." The Court rejected
this claim, emphasizing that IXC had canvassed the market thoroughly, and
that the provision had been adopted late in the exploration process. The
Court also stated that "[p]rovisions such as these are common in merger
agreements and do not imply some automatic breach of fiduciary duty."'
2
The Court did not mention Phelps Dodge or Ace.
In State of Wisconsin Investment Board v. Bartlett, the Court of Chancery
ordered a stockholder meeting to vote on a merger agreement between
Medco Research and King Pharmaceutical be delayed for 15 days in order to
allow Medco stockholders sufficient time to consider supplemental
disclosures made by Medco regarding the background of the merger
agreement.
3
After announcement of the Medco-King merger, plaintiff, a Medco
stockholder, sued alleging, among other things, that the proxy materials
disseminated about the merger failed to disclose material facts regarding the
background of the merger. The meeting of Medco stockholders to vote on
the merger was scheduled for February 10, 2000. OnJanuary 31, 2000, in an
a Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 105-06 (Del. 1994).
9 Ace Ltd., 747 A.2d 95.
10 In re IXC Communications, Inc. S'holder Litig., Consol. CA No. 17324, Steele, V.C. (Del.
Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
" Id. at 14.
t2 Id.
13 State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v- Bartlett, CA No. 17727, Steele, V.C. (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2000)
(Order).
DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE LAW
attempt to address some of the alleged omissions in the proxy statement, the
defendants distributed supplemental proxy materials (as well as a new proxy
card) which the Court found "directly and materially enrich the quality of
information potentially available to the shareholder and might reasonably
affect their vote or motivate them to change a vote already cast." 4 Plaintiff
'moved to enjoin the February 10 meeting on the grounds that stockholders
had not had sufficient time to consider the supplemental proxy materials and
change their vote if they desired.
The Court held that it could not conclude with confidence that the 10
days betweenJanuary 31 and February 10 gave Medco stockholders the time
necessary to receive and consider the supplemental materials, and to modify
their votes if they chose to do so. The Court further held that in light of this
conclusion, the Medco stockholders would suffer irreparable harm as a
matter of law if they voted for or against the merger on February 10, 2000.
Accordingly, the Court enjoined the vote on the merger agreement for an
additional 15-day period in order to permit the shareholders sufficient time
to consider the supplemental information.
Subsequently, the Court issued a memorandum opinion denying a
motion to enjoin the shareholder vote on the Medco-King merger at the
postponed meeting. The plaintiff alleged that the members of the Medco
board had breached their duties of loyalty, care, and disclosure in approving
the merger. In particular, the plaintiff argued that the supplemental
disclosures failed to cure certain material misdisclosures in the proxy
materials, and thus continued to be materially misleading, that the Medco
board members breached their duty of care by improperly delegating to one
director (the Chairman) the responsibility to negotiate the transaction, by
failing to inform themselves of the Chairman's actions, by agreeing to pay the
Chairman a fee of .75% of the transaction value, which allegedly created an
improper financial incentive in the Chairman that placed him in a conflict
with the interests of the other Medco stockholders, by failing to reconsider
and reaffirm the board recommendation of the merger agreement in light of
the supplemental disclosures made, the delay in the date of the stockholder
meeting, and that the Medco board members breached their duty of loyalty
by agreeing to pay the Chairman an excessive fee for negotiating the
transaction and by agreeing to include termination fee, no talk/no shop, and
stock option provisions in the merger agreement." The Court rejected each
of these claims, finding that the Medco board members were disinterested,
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informed, good faith exercise of their business judgment. In so doing, the
Court expressly found that the payment of a negotiating fee to a director of
.75% of the transaction value was a matter within the business judgment of
the Medco board and did not constitute waste. The Court also reiterated the
view, expressed in IXC, that the inclusion of provisions such as no talk, no
shop, termination fees, and cross options in a merger agreement is to be
reviewed under the business judgment rule absent a pre-existing acquisition
proposal from a third party. Finally, the Court rejected a claim that the
Medco board, in light of the delay in the previously set shareholder vote,
breached the duty of care by failing to reconsider and update its recommen-
dation that the Medco stockholders vote in favor of the merger.
In the aftermath of Phelps Dodge,Ace, JXC, and Bartlett, it appears that the
Delaware Court of Chancery will evaluate more closely the use of no
solicitation clauses in merger agreements. The analysis appears fact specific,
with the exact terms of the clause and the context in which it was approved
(and perhaps judicially reviewed) figuring heavily in the analysis. Phelps
Dodge and Ace suggest that no solicitation provisions that forbid discussions
with or providing information to third-party bidders with no fiduciary out
or with only a highly restrictive fiduciary out are suspect. Ace, IXC and
Bartlett indicate, however, that such clauses may be permissible if the board
has canvassed the market fully or agreed to the provision to obtain an
auction-ending bid. The presence of a third-party bidder offering a topping
bid, as in Phelps Dodge and Ace, has significant implications for the analysis.
The facts in !XC and Bartlett, where no topping bid emerged and the target
appears to have adequately canvassed the market, provide a scenario where
such provisions may be deemed acceptable. Phelps Dodge andAce also suggest
that provisions in stock-for-stock merger agreements that have defensive or
protective features may be reviewed by Delaware courts under enhanced
scrutiny, even if the decision to enter into the merger itself is subject only to
business judgment review.
II. STOCKHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS
Several recent decisions of the Court of Chancery have addressed the
voting rights of stockholders of Delaware corporations. These decisions
reflect the central importance of the stockholder franchise under Delaware
law.
In Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,16 the Court of Chancery held that a
supermajority bylaw adopted by the board of directors of Shorewood
16 Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, CA. No. 17626, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2000).
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Packaging Corp. in response to a threatened tender offer and consent
solicitation by Chesapeake Corporation constituted a breach of the
Shorewood directors' fiduciary duties. The decision marks only the third
time since 1989 that the Court of Chancery has found that the directors of
a Delaware corporation breached their fiduciary duties in responding to a
takeover threat.
Chesapeake responded to a bear-hug letter from Shorewood by counter-
proposing an acquisition of Shorewood by Chesapeake. The Shorewood
board rejected Chesapeake's proposal as inadequate. The board subsequently
adopted a package of six bylaw amendments designed to cut off Chesapeake's
ability to conduct a proxy fight or consent solicitation, including a provision
requiring a 66 2/3% supermajority of Shorewood's outstanding stock to
amend Shorewood's bylaws. Chesapeake then announced a tender offer and
consent solicitation. Chesapeake also filed litigation challenging the
supermajority bylaw and obtained an expedited schedule for trial.
Shorewood subsequently rejected the tender offer as inadequate. Barely one
week before trial, Shorewood held a brief telephonic meeting during which
the directors reduced the voting requirement under the supermajority bylaw
from 66 2/3% to 60%.
The Court found that the Shorewood directors breached their fiduciary
duties by adopting and later amending the supermajority bylaw. While the
Court found that the directors had a good faith basis for believing that the
price offered by Chesapeake was inadequate, it rejected the directors' claim
that they also identified a risk of substantive coercion due to stockholder
confusion. The Court found no persuasive evidence that the directors
actually considered the issue of stockholder confusion when they adopted the
supermajority bylaw. Moreover, the Court found that if the directors had
considered it, the threat would have been unfounded in light of Shorewood's
stockholder profile, the ample coverage of Shorewood by public analysts,
Shorewood's thorough public disclosures, and the testimony ofShorewood's
own directors about Shorewood's ability to communicate effectively with its
stockholders. Based on these factors, the Court concluded that the
purported threat of stockholder confusion was a "post hoc, litigation-inspired
rationale." 7
The Court then evaluated whether the supermajority bylaw was a
proportionate response to the threats the board identified. The Court found
that the Shorewood board had never considered whether the supermajority
bylaw would make it mathematically impossible for Chesapeake to succeed
in its consent solicitation. The Court concluded that the board's
17 Id.
2002]
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"impoverished deliberations" constituted a breach of the duty of care.'" The
Court further found that the supermajority bylaw was preclusive as a factual
matter, irrespective of the information (or lack thereof) considered by the
board.
The Court also found that even if the supermajority bylaw were not
preclusive, the Shorewood directors had failed to show that it was reasonable.
The Court described the defensive measure as "an extremely aggressive and
overreaching response to a very mild threat."'9 The Court also rejected the
board's assertion that it adopted the supermajority bylaw with the goal of
placing the decision to amend the bylaws in the control of a majority of
Shorewood's disinterested shares. The Court found that when the expected
voter turnout and the shares controlled by management were taken into
account, the effect of the bylaw amendment would be that Chesapeake
would be required to obtain the vote of at least 88% of the disinterested
shares for its proxy solicitation to be successful. This not only was "pretty
wide of the target at which the board aimed" but also was beyond any "level
within the realm of reason." 20
The Court also concluded the Shorewood board adopted the
supermajority bylaw purposefully, to interfere with, or impede the exercise
of the stockholder franchise; the directors therefore had to show a
compellingjustification for their actions. The Court found the directors had
not offered any compellingjustification for the supermajority bylaw.
Having concluded that Chesapeake was entitled to judgment on its
claims, the Court turned to Shorewood's counterclaims. First, the Court
rejected a claim that under Section 141(k) of the General Corporation Law
the Shorewood directors had "a vested right to serve out the remainder of
their terms, even if their constituents... decide to eliminate [Shorewood's]
classified board structure."2' The Court found that the Shorewood
stockholders had clear authority to amend the company's bylaws to eliminate
the classified board structure, and that as "soon as that validly happens, the
Shorewood directors will no longer serve as directors ofa 'corporation whose
board is classified'... [and] will at that time be removable without cause."22
Second, the Court considered Shorewood's argument that by purchasing a
14.9% block of Shorewood's stock from Shorewood's largest stockholder,
Chesapeake in fact had entered into an agreement under which that




21 Shore, CA No. 17626.
Id.
DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE LAW
in the consent solicitation, making Chesapeake an "interested stockholder"
of Shorewood under the Section 203 of the General Corporation Law. (there
should be a footnote cite here and other places where statutes are referenced
unless the complete cite and format is in the text) The Court rejected this
claim based on the plain meaning of the stock purchase agreement and,
assuming arguendo that the agreement were ambiguous, based on all of the
available extrinsic evidence. The Court also rejected a related argument that
upside protection that Chesapeake agreed to in the stock purchase agreement,
pursuant to which the seller would enjoy all of the additional value of any
higher Chesapeake bid and half of the additional value of any higher third-
party bid, gave rise to an ownership interest for purposes of Section 203.
In BBC Capital Market, Inc. v. Carver Bancorp, Inc.,23 BBC sought
preliminarily to enjoin Carver from countingthe votes ofshares representing
approximately 8.3% of the outstanding voting power which had been issued
to two allegedly friendly investors, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and
Provender Capital Opportunities Fund. BBC had previously indicated its
intention (and subsequently undertook) to initiate a proxy solicitation for the
two seats (of the eight-member board) to be voted upon at the upcoming
annual meeting. BBC argued that the preferred stock issuance was done for
the primary purpose of impeding its ability to win the proxy solicitation and
therefore should be subject to the onerous Blasius standard of review. Unlike
in Chesapeake, BBC did not argue, nor did Carver concede, that the preferred
stock issuance was done as a defensive measure, which should more properly
be subject to review under the heightened scrutiny of Unocal. Moreover,
BBC did not contend that the preferred stock issuance would preclude it
from success in its solicitation. Rather, BBC argued that all it needed to
show was the electoral process was tainted, and that the issuance was done
for the primary purpose of affecting the election.
Although finding that plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to
withstand a motion to dismiss if one had existed, the Court denied the
motion for preliminary injunction. First, the Court concluded that the
relevant facts as to the board's motive in issuing the preferred stock were
hotly contested and that it could not grant injunctive relief"where important
questions of material fact turn on the credibility of witnesses, with a focus
upon actions they did or did not take based upon their subjective intent. "2"
Second, the Court held that because granting BBC's application would result
in full, final and complete relief tantamount to summary judgment in view
of the fact that Morgan Stanley and Provender would forever be denied the
23 BBC Capital Mkt., Inc. v. Carver Barcorp., Inc., CA No. 17743, Steele, V.C. (Del. Ch. Feb.
16, 2000) (bench ruling).
24 Id.
2002]
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opportunity to vote at the annual meeting, the harm to defendants would far
outweigh the harm to plaintiff by denying the relief. Because the Court
based its holding on these grounds, it did not reach the defendants' argument
that plaintiff could not show irreparable harm where it offered no evidence
that Carver's actions precluded it from succeeding at the annual meeting.
In Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., plaintiffs brought suit under 8
Del. C. Section 225 seeking restoration of their seats on the Reliance board
after they were removed "for cause." 25 The plaintiffs argued that their
removal violated Reliance's certificate of incorporation, bylaws and a series
of corporate and stockholder agreements naming them as directors,
specifying the method of director removal and effectively guaranteeing their
seats on the board for at least three years. Reliance originally was
incorporated in Texas, but later redomiciled in Delaware, ostensibly for the
sole purpose of having its internal affairs governed by Delaware corporate
law. Plaintiffs' interpretation of their rights arguably was correct as a matter
of Texas law. The question was whether such rights were consistent with
Delaware law.
The plaintiffs argued: 1) the designation of specific directors in the
various corporate instruments overrode the statutory requirement in 8 Del.
C. Section 211 of an annual election of directors, and 2) the sole method of
director removal was contained in the bylaws. The Court rejected both of
these arguments, stating that "except in the case of a properly classified board,
all directors must face the electorate on [an] annual basis at the corporation's
annual stockholders' meeting" and that therefore a certificate of
incorporation can only specify the board of directors for an initial period of
time.26 The Court further held that the right to remove a director is vested
in the stockholders by 8 Del. C. Section 141(k), and this right could not be
superseded by a contrary provision in a corporate instrument. "Like the right
to elect directors, Delaware law considers the right to remove directors to be
a fundamental element of stockholder authority."27 The Court simply was
unwilling to read the corporate governance documents and agreements in a
way that did violence to the stockholder franchise under Delaware law, and
accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims.
In its ruling, the Court also addressed the question of whether a
stockholder could "cast a vote for or against removal of the four [Reliance]
directors it [did] not exclusively appoint. 28 The Court explained that Section
5 Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., C.A. No. 17992, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch. July 21,
2000).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 27.
28 Id. at31.
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141(k) (2) draws a distinction between stockholder voting rights in for-cause
and without-cause removal votes. In a without cause vote, Section 141 (k) (2)
limits participation to those stockholders who are entitled to vote for the class
of directors whose seats are at stake, whereas that section places no
restrictions on the power of stockholders to remove a director for cause.
"Logically, the failure of the statute to permit such a limitation on a vote on
the 'for cause' removal of a director implicitly means that a stockholder with
the right to vote on the election of [a] single member of the board of
directors may participate in the vote to remove for cause any of the other
members of the board of directors."
29
In State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Systems Corp., the Court of
Chancery considered the plaintiffs challenge to an adjournment of the
annual stockholders meeting of defendant Peerless Systems Corporation by
Peerless's Chairman and CEO, as authorized by the company's bylaws,
which postponed the closing of the polls on a proposal to add 1,000,000
shares to the company's stock option plan.3" Had the annual meeting not
been adjourned, the proposal would have been defeated, but the proposal was
approved by a slim margin when the meeting was reconvened thirty days
later. In its complaint, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants inequitably,
and in breach of their fiduciary duties, interfered with and manipulated the
voting at the annual meeting, deprived Peerless stockholders of their voting
rights, and omitted material information and made false and misleading
statements concerning the adjournment.
In considering the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Court applied Blasius and concluded that "the primary purpose behind the
adjournment was to ensure the passage of [the proposal] by interfering with
the shareholder vote and allowing [the proposal] to have more time to gain
votes."3' The Court based its conclusion on the inconsistent actions of the
Peerless board in closing the polls on other proposals while adjourning the
voting on the stock option proposal, uncontroverted testimony from Peerless
employees concerning the purpose of adjourning the meeting, and the lack
of formal disclosures by the company which would support its claimed goal
of increasing voter turnout at the reconvened meeting. The Court also
found, however, that the evidence produced by the parties did not resolve
important issues of fact with respect to whether the defendants had
demonstrated a compelling justification for their actions. Therefore, while
the Court believed "it is doubtful that at the end of the day, based on the
29 Id. at 32.
30 State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., CA No. 17637, Chandler, C. (Del. Ch.
Dec. 4,2000).
31 Id. at 30.
20021
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factual record presently before me, the defendants will have provided a
compellingjustification for their actions," it nonetheless denied the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims under
Blasius.32 The Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
plaintiffs' disclosure claims, finding that the defendants complied with
Delaware law concerning the required notice for reconvened shareholders
meetings and did not omit material information relating to their intention to
adjourn the annual meeting or the procedures to be followed at the
reconvened meeting.
I. REvLON DUTES
Over the past few years, the Delaware courts have continued to refine the
boundaries of the so-called Revlon duty to maximize shareholder value
concerning a change in control transaction.
In In Re Lukens Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the Court of Chancery
dismissed a complaint filed by shareholders of Lukens, Inc. alleging that the
Lukens board breached its fiduciary duties in connection with the merger of
Lukens with Bethlehem Steel Corporation.33 In particular, the plaintiffs
alleged that the directors had breached their duty under Revlon v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., by, inter alia, allowing Bethlehem and a competing
bidder for Lukens to reach a secret side agreement pursuant to which
Bethlehem, if successful in merging with Lukens, would sell certain Lukens'
assets to the competing bidder. 4  No one ever brought a motion for
injunctive relief
The Court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b) (6), finding that the
complaint, which alleged no interest on the part of a majority of the Lukens
board, and assuming arguendo that Revlon duties applied, failed to allege a
breach of those duties. In reaching this conclusion, the Court made several
important rulings. First, the Court clarified the relationship between so-
called Revlon duties and the duties of care and loyalty, rejecting plaintiffs'
contention that "when so-called Revlon duties are alleged, the duties of care,
good faith and loyalty become 'intertwined' so that directorial failure to
obtain the highest price, even if solely due to gross negligence, amounts to
a breach of the duty of loyalty."3" The Court explained that a "corporate
board's failure to obtain the best value for its stockholders may be the result
of illicit motivation (bad faith), personal interest divergent from shareholder
32 Id.
3 In re Lukens Inc. S'holder Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999).
3 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
35 Lukens, 752 A.2d 720, at 730.
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interest (disloyalty) or a lack of due care."36 The Court held that the
complaint failed to allege facts which would implicate anything other than
due care, such that Lukens' Section 102(b)(7) provision would operate to
protect the directors from personal liability.
Additionally, although the Court did not base its holding on this ground,
the Court rejected, in a lengthy footnote, defendants' argument that the
heightened scrutiny of Revlon would be inapplicable in any event because
over 30% of the merger consideration consisted of shares of the common
stock of Bethlehem, a widely held company with no controlling stockholder.
While noting that the Delaware Supreme Court "has not set out a black line
rule explaining what percentage of the consideration can be cash without
triggering Revlon," the Court found that the Lukens merger, which involved
approximately 60% cash, would constitute a change in control, reasoningthat
"for a substantial majority of the then-current shareholders, there is no long
run."
37
In In Re Pennaco Energy, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Marathon Oil sought
to acquire Pennaco Energy through a tender offer and cash-out merger. 38 In
an attempt to enjoin the close of Marathon's tender offer, two Pennaco
stockholders sued Pennaco Energy, the Pennaco board, and Marathon Oil.
Plaintiffs alleged that the Pennaco Board had violated its duty under Revlon
to obtain the best value reasonably available for the Pennaco stockholders.
Specifically, plaintiffs took issue with the board's failure to conduct an
auction and its approval of generous severance and non-compete packages for
the inside directors. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the duty of
disclosure. The complaint alleged that Marathon had aided and abetted these
violations. The Court found none of the allegations sufficient to enjoin the
close of the tender offer.
The Court began by evaluating plaintiffs' Revlon claims. Although an
auction is the standard means by which a board of directors ensures that it
has secured the best availabie transaction, the Court emphasized that it is not
the only means. Here, the board's decision that an auction was unnecessary
was supported by the following circumstances: Pennaco had long been a
source of industry interest, the board had extensive knowledge about
Pennaco and its worth, the board negotiated a better price, and the merger
agreement lacked onerous deal-protection mechanisms, as well as allowed for
a post-agreement market check. Thus, the Court found the board's choice
36 id.
37 Id. at 731 n.25 (citing TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., CA. Nos. 10427, 10298,
Allen, C. (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989)).
38 In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S'holder Litig., Consol. CA. No. 18606, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch.
February 5, 2001).
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to deal only with Marathon not so unreasonable as to justify enjoining the
tender offer.
The Court also concluded that the process by which the board approved
severance and non-compete packages for the inside directors was not so
flawed as to merit injunctive relief. The Court did find the process to have
been less than ideal, by the compensation committee allowing management
to steer the process. Nonetheless, the Court found a number of factors
mitigated against issuing an injunction, including: Delaware courts'
reluctance to second-guess compensation decisions, the Board's
consideration of the packages before Marathon's expression of interest, valid
tax reasons to approve the agreements, and that the packages represented only
1% of the total transaction value.
Finally, the Court turned to plaintiffs' allegations that the directors had
violated their duty of disclosure, most notably by failing to disclose an e-mail
sent by Pennaco's CFO to Marathon. The undisclosed e-mail contained
valuations that, if true, would justify a per share price significantly higher
than that being offered by Marathon. After a second deposition of the CFO
was held and the transcript given to the Court for review, the Court
concluded that the e-mail appeared to be a bargaining ploy, unsubstantiated
by reliable valuations and designed solely to elicit a higher offer from
Marathon. The Court thus found its omission insufficient to warrant
injunctive relief; however, the Court did note that it would not be surprised
if omission of the e-mail and its valuations were held to be material after a
full hearing on the merits.
IV. REVIEW OF DIsMIssAL UNDER RuLE 23.1
In an en banc decision, the Delaware Supreme Court recently clarified
that the dismissal of a complaint for failure to plead demand futility in a
derivative action will be reviewed under a de novo standard of review.
In Brehm v. Eisner,39 plaintiffs, stockholders of The Walt Disney
Company, appealed the Court of Chancery's dismissal under Chancery
Court Rule 23.1 of their complaint challenging the board's action in
approving certain compensation arrangements with Disney's former
president, Michael Ovitz. The Court of Chancery had dismissed the
complaint, with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts
creating a reasonable doubt that the directors were disinterested or
independent, or that their conduct was protected by the business judgment
rule, so as to excuse pre-suit demand upon the board. On appeal, the
39 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (en banc).
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Delaware Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint, but reversed the Court of Chancery's determination that such
dismissal should be with prejudice, and remanded the action to allow
plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.
This opinion is notable in at least three respects. First, as a substantive
matter, the Supreme Court indicated that "the sheer size of the payout to
Ovitz, as alleged, pushes the envelope of judicial respect for the business
judgment of directors in making compensation decisions,"' suggesting that
there may well be an outer limit to business judgment protection where
compensation decisions are concerned. Equally important, as a procedural
matter, the Supreme Court held that its review of a dismissal under Rule
23.1 "is de novo and plenary," notwithstanding that all parties to the appeal
had agreed that the appropriate standard of review was the abuse of discretion
standard.4 In this regard, the Supreme Court effectively overruled those
portions (which it characterized as dicta) of the opinion in Aronson v. Lewis,
that had been interpreted as holding that review of a dismissal under Rule
23.1 was "deferential, [and] limited to a determination of whether the Court
of Chancery abused its discretion."42
Finally, the opinion recognizes the distinction between principles of
corporation law and good corporate governance practices. In prefacing the
analysis under Rule 23.1, the Delaware Supreme Court wrote:
This is a case about whether there should be personal liability of the
directors ofa Delaware corporation to the corporation for lack of due
care in the decision making process and for waste of corporate assets.
This case is not about the failure of the directors to establish and
carry out ideal corporate governance practices. 43
All good corporate governance practices include compliance with
statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary duties. However, the law of
corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of those duties are
distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal corporate governance practices.
Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for boards of
directors that go beyond the minimal legal requirements of the corporation
law are highly desirable, often tend to benefit stockholders, sometimes
40 Id.
41 Id. at 253.
42 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,814 (Del. 1984); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253.
43 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255-56.
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reduce litigation, and can usually help directors avoid liability; but they are
not required by the corporation law and do not define standards of liability.
4
V. INDEMNIFICATION AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
In a series of recent decisions, the Delaware courts have addressed the
indemnification rights of directors, and other issues relating to executive
compensation. In Cochran v. Stifel Financial Corp., the Court of Chancery
considered a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint seeking
indemnification."
The plaintiff, a former director, officer and employee of Stifel Nicolaus,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Stifel Financial, filed suit against Stifel
Financial for indemnification, claiming that he served Stifel Nicolaus in
those capacities at the request of Stifel Financial and therefore was Stifel
Financial's agent. The plaintiff's indemnification claims arose out of a SEC
investigation of the subsidiary, which led to federal indictments against the
plaintiff. After trial, the plaintiff was acquitted on thirteen counts, but
convicted on eight counts. On appeal, his conviction was reversed.
Subsequently, the subsidiary initiated arbitration against the plaintiff, alleging
various contractual and fiduciary duty claims. The arbitrator awarded the
subsidiary $1.2 million on certain of the contract claims, but determined that
the plaintiff had not violated his fiduciary duties. The plaintiff sought
indemnification from Stifel Financial for the costs he incurred in the SEC
investigation and criminal proceeding, the $1.2 millionjudgment against him
in the arbitration, and for his expenses in defending the arbitration.
Stifel Financial first argued that the complaint should be dismissed
because it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 10 Del. C.
Section 8111. The Court rejected this defense, concluding that the three-
year statute of limitations found in 10 Del. C. Section 8106 applied. The
Court reasoned that the Delaware Supreme Court had given a broad
construction to Section 145 in order to advance the statute's pro-
indemnification approach; the Court declined to narrow that construction
through application of a statute of limitations. The Court also concluded
that where there is doubt as to which of two statutes of limitations should be
applied, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the longer period.
Second, Stifel Financial argued that the complaint should be dismissed
because the plaintiff did not make a demand for indemnification before
commencing litigation. The Court rejected this argument because it was not
44 Id.
4s Cochran v. Stifel Financial Corp., CA No. 17350, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch. Mar. 8,2000), appeal
refused, 750 A.2d 530 (Del. 2000).
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supported by Section 145. Section 145(k) vests the Court of Chancery with
exclusive jurisdiction over indemnification claims; "[t]his authority is not
dependent on a prior demand by the plaintiff seeking indemnity."' Further,
the text of Section 145(d) contemplates that a judicial determination of
whether indemnification is warranted can be made, instead of such a
determination by the corporation. The Court noted that although a
corporation that wishes to make a demand a predicate to permissive
indemnification can do so by requiring such a demand in its bylaws, the
defendant corporation had chosen not to employ such a provision.
Third, Stifel Financial argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to
indemnification for the $1.2 million arbitration award because the arbitration
claims were brought "by or in the right" of Stifel Financial by its wholly
owned subsidiary, Stifel Nicolaus, thereby bringing the plaintiffs claim
within Section 145(b), which is more restrictive than Section 145(a). The
Court rejected this contention, concluding that the corporation referred to
in the phrase "by or in the right of the corporation" in Section 145(b) is the
corporation from which indemnity is sought. 47
Finally, with respect to the plaintiff's claim for mandatory
indemnification for expenses arising out of the defense of claims on which
he was either exonerated or held not liable, Stifel Financial claimed that the
plaintiff could not rely on Section 145(c) because the complaint failed to
allege facts sufficient to support an agency relationship between the plaintiff
and Stifel Financial. Because the indemnification claims were for acts that
occurred before the amendment of Section 145(c) onJuly 1, 1997, the prior
version of Section 145(c) (which provided for mandatory indemnification of
corporate agents) applied. The Court concluded that the complaint failed to
allege facts sufficient to support the existence ofa principal-agent relationship
between the plaintiff and Stifel Financial, although it granted the plaintiffs
request to replead the claim. The Court further opined that the issue may
be academic, since Stifel Financial's "maximally broad" indemnification
bylaw may require mandatory indemnification regardless of whether the
plaintiff is an agent of Stifel Financial."
In a later decision in the Stifel action, the Court of Chancery addressed
the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. In Cochran v. Stifel
Financial Corporation, the Court granted Stifel's motion as to certain claims,
and Cochran's motion as to others.49
Id. at 24.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 45-46.
49 Cochran v. Stifel Financial Corp., CA No. 17350, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch. Dec. 19,2000).
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Cochran was not a director, officer, or employee of Stifel. Stifel elected
Cochran to the board ofStifel Nicolaus ("SN"), its wholly owned subsidiary.
Cochran also served as an officer and employee of SN. Cochran, however,
sought indemnification directly from Stifel as an agent of Stifel, rather than
from SN. Cochran's motion arose out of two separate matters. First, after
Cochran left the employ of SN, the U.S. attorney charged him with
numerous counts of criminal fraud (the "Criminal Proceeding"). He was
convicted at trial, but the conviction was overturned on appeal, and the
dismissal of the charges became final. Cochran sought indemnification for
costs and expenses in the criminal action based on Stifel's indemnification
bylaw (the "Indemnification Bylaw"). Second, Cochran also sought
indemnification for an arbitration initiated by SN against him before the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the "Arbitration
Proceeding"), in which SN alleged that Cochran received unearned
compensation (the "Excessive Compensation Claim"), breached his fiduciary
duties to SN (the "Breach of Duty Claim") and breached a non-competition
clause in his employment contract (the "Non-compete Claim"). There was
also a claim on a promissory note (the "Promissory Note Claim").
Ultimately, the arbitrator awarded SN $1.2 million on the Excessive
Compensation and Promissory Note Claims, but determined that Cochran
was not liable for a fiduciary violation. SN abandoned the Non-compete
Claim. Therefore, Cochran sought indemnification arguing that he was
successful on the Breach of Duty Claim and the Non-compete Claim.
Cochran also sought indemnification for the Promissory Note and Excessive
Compensation Claims, under Section 145(a).
The motions came down to two primary contentions. First, that Stifel
was entitled to summary judgment on the Excessive Compensation,
Promissory Note, and Non-compete Claims because those claims were not
brought against Cochran by reason of his service in his indemnifiable
capacities. Second, that Cochran was entitled to summary judgment on the
Criminal Proceeding and Breach of Duty Claim under the Indemnification
Bylaw because he was successful in defending those matters.
Cochran claimed that Stifel owed him indemnification for the Excessive
Compensation, Promissory Note and Non-compete Claims because his
status as director, officer and employee of SN was essential to the claims, so
they arose by reason of the fact that he held those positions at SN. The Court
found that obligations an employee accepts under a contract are personal
obligations. Therefore, the Excessive Compensation, Promissory Note and
Non-compete Claims were brought against Cochran by reason of the fact
that he had allegedly breached personal contractual obligations owed to SN
rather than "by reason of the fact" that he was serving in indemnification-
eligible positions at SN, so he was not entitled to indemnification under
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section 145 or the Indemnification Bylaw. Therefore, the Court granted
Stifel's motion for summary judgment on the Excessive Compensation,
Promissory Note, and Non-compete Claims.
Cochran's summaryjudgment motion as to the Criminal Proceedingand
the Breach of Duty Claim centered on the Indemnification Bylaw that
requires Stifel to indemnify any individual serving "any other enterprise as
a director, officer or employee at the request of" Stifel "to the full extent
authorized by law.""0 This required Stifel to indemnify Cochran if such
indemnity would be permissible under the General Corporation Law.
Under Section 145(c) a corporation must indemnify directors and officers
who have been successful on the merits or otherwise in any defense of an
action covered by Section 145(a) or 145(b). Sections 145 (a) and (b) permit
the corporation to indemnify its directors (including officers, employees and
agents) for attorneys' fees and other expenses that arose by reason of their
capacity as directors (if their conduct was in good faith and in a manner
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation), and for
judgments rendered against directors, or amounts paid in settlement of civil
cases in third-party actions by directors. Both the Criminal Proceeding and
the Breach of Duty Claim arose by reason of Cochran's service in his various
capacities at SN, and in both cases, he was successful on the merits or
otherwise. If Cochran were an officer or director of Stifel, his right to
indemnification would be mandatory. Under Section 145(0, a corporation
may provide broader indemnification rights than those set forth in Section
145, unless those rights are contrary to the limitations set forth in Section
145, other statutes, court decisions, or public policy. The Court found that
since Stifel would be required to indemnify its own CEO under the same
circumstances, it would be permissible for Stifel to indemnify Cochran
under Section 145(o. The Court also found that because Stifel's
Indemnification Bylaw required Stifel to indemnify Cochran if it could
lawfully do so, it was contractually bound to do so. Therefore, the Court
granted Cochran's motion for summary judgment as to the Criminal
Proceeding and the Breach of Duty Claim.
In Sanders v. Computer Associates, Int'l, Inc., the Court of Chancery
considered claims that directors of Computer Associates had improperly
administered a key employee stock option plan ("KESOP"). s' Section 3.1 of
the KESOP authorized the compensation committee of the Computer
Associates board to grant up to 6 million shares of the company's common
stock to the KESOP's participants (three directors who also were the
50 Id.
s Sanders v. Computer Assoc., Int'l, C.A. No. 16640, Steele, V.C. (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999).
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company's top executives). The KESOP did not specifically permit the
compensation committee to adjust the number of shares granted to account
for stock splits or recapitalizations, although Section 6.2 granted the plan's
administrators broad authority to interpret and administer the plan. By 1998,
the compensation committee had granted the participants 20.25 million
shares, which was equivalent to 6 million shares adjusted for three stock
splits. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants granted more shares than the
number authorized by the KESOP and asserted various claims against the
directors flowing from the grants. The plaintiffs moved forjudgment on the
pleadings or, alternatively, summary judgment; the defendants moved to
dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 23.1 and for judgment on the pleadings.
The Court first determined that demand was excused because the facts
alleged in the complaint raised a reasonable doubt that the share grants
resulted from a valid exercise of business judgment. At a minimum, the
plaintiffs had alleged facts which, if true, showed that the board violated an
express KESOP provision limiting the number of shares they were
authorized to award.
Addressing the remaining motions, the Court concluded that the
KESOP clearly limited to 6 million the total number of shares that could be
granted under the plan. While Section 6.2 gave the board authority to
interpret and administer the KESOP, it did not provide authority to ignore
the express 6 million share limitation. The Court rejected defendants'
argument that the award of shares more than 6 million carried out the
purpose and intent of the KESOP. Accordingly, the Court ordered the
recipients to return the excess shares to the corporation, imposed a
constructive trust on the recipients, and ordered an accounting rendered for
any economic benefit derived from the excess shares.
In Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, the Court of Chancery rejected a challenge to
the validity of severance payments made to corporate officers, upon a change
in control of the corporation.5 2
In 1994, Dickstein Partners initiated a consent solicitation to remove and
replace certain members of the Hills board of directors. As part of its
response to Dickstein's overtures, the Hills board approved employment
agreements for seven of Hills' top executives. Under the new employment
agreements, the right to severance payments was triggered upon the
demotion or discharge of the executive within one year of a change of
control, or the occurrence of any change of control which was not approved
by a majority of the Hills board. The rationale for the double trigger was to
52 Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, CA. Nos. 14527, 14460, 14787, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch. Feb. 22,
2000).
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provide the Hills board with leverage in negotiations with any potential
acquirer and to reassure Hills' creditors that a change in control would not
necessarily result in the exodus of the company's management with
substantial severance payments. Certain stockholders of Hills subsequently
filed a derivative and class action challenging the adoption of the
employment agreements. As part of a settlement of that action the Court of
Chancery approved, Dickstein agreed not to pursue any claims regarding the
adoption of the employment agreements.
In May 1995, Dickstein proposed to acquire all of Hills' outstanding
shares and commenced a proxy contest to replace the incumbent members
of the Hills' board. The Hills board rejected Dickstein's initial proposal and
a later revised proposal because, among other reasons, the Hills board
supported management's business strategy, the company's stock was trading
near its twelve month low, Dickstein's professed strategy to leverage the
company had forced other similar companies into bankruptcy, and Dickstein
had not secured firm financing. The Hills board did not adopt any additional
defensive measures, and instead focused on attempting to win the proxy
contest.
Shortly before the meeting of the Hills stockholders, the Hills board
considered whether to approve the potential Dickstein-initiated change in
control solely for eliminating the executives' right to substantial severance
payments under their employment agreements. At that time, the Hills board
knew of the probability that the Dickstein slate would win the election.
Upon the advice of counsel, the Hills board declined to approve the
prospective change in control solely for purposes of the employment
agreements because such action would be inconsistent with the overall
opposition of the Hills board to the Dickstein acquisition proposal and proxy
contest.
After the Dickstein slate won the election, the covered executives
resigned and received their substantial severance payments from rabbi trusts
established by Hills. Dickstein (acting through the company) and other Hills
stockholders initiated actions alleging, among other things, that the former
Hills directors breached their fiduciary duties and committed waste by
refusing to approve the Dickstein change of control to eliminate Hills'
obligation to make the severance payments under the executives'
employment agreements.
The Court determined that the Hills board was required to demonstrate
that, after reasonable investigation, it determined in good faith that the
corporation faced a threat warranting a defensive response and that its
defensive measures were proportionate to the identified threat. The Court
concluded that because Dickstein had waived its right to challenge the
validity ofthe employment agreements in connection with the 1994 litigation
20021
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settlement, Dickstein could not in good faith claim that the severance
payments were a disproportionate response to a change of control proposal
which the Hills board concluded was adverse to the interests of Hills and its
stockholders. The Court emphasized that plaintiffs had failed to challenge
the determination of the Hills board that the Dickstein change of control
constituted a threat to Hills and its stockholders. The Court rejected
plaintiffs' attempt to focus narrowly on whether the members of the Hills
board breached their fiduciary duties by refusing to approve the change of
control solely for purposes of the employment agreements. Recognizingthat
the executives had remained with the company during a proxy contest in
which the Hills board opposed the Dickstein change of control as well as the
fact that the board had determined that the Dickstein change in control
would be harmful to the company, the Court found that the Hills board
members would have breached the employment agreements if they had
voted to approve the Dickstein change of control simply to avoid the
severance payments. The Court concluded that the Hills board acted
reasonably because the former directors believed that Dickstein posed a
threat and that Hills should comply with its contractual obligations under the
employment agreements. Accordingly, the Court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty and
waste claims.
VI. MAJORITY STOCKHOLDER TRANSACTIONS
In two recent decisions, the Delaware Courts have addressed the duties
of directors in transactions involving majority stockholders.
In McMullin v. Beran,s3 the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Chancery's dismissal of a complaint filed by a stockholder of Atlantic
Ritchfield Chemical Company ("ARCO") alleging that ARCO Chemical's
board breached its fiduciary duties in approving a transaction with Lyondell
Petrochemical Company pursuant to which Lyondell acquired all shares of
ARCO Chemical's stock for $57.75 per share. Atlantic Richfield Company,
an 82% stockholder of ARCO Chemical, was primarily responsible for
negotiating the transaction with Lyondell. Among other things, the plaintiff
argued that the ARCO Chemical board breached its fiduciary duties under
Revlon and improperly abdicated its fiduciary responsibilities and delegated
them to ARCO. The Court of Chancery granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss, finding that the transaction did not constitute a change of control as
contemplated by Revlon since the minority stockholders never had a right to,
S3 McMullin v. Beran, 765 A2d 910 (Dec. 2000).
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and therefore could not be deprived of, a control premium. The Court of
Chancery further held that the ARCO Chemical board had no duty to take
a more active role in the sale process led by ARCO since it would have been
fruitless for ARCO Chemical to pursue any transaction in which ARCO had
no interest.
On appeal, the Supreme Court first noted that "[t]he statutory duties and
common law fiduciary responsibilities that directors of a Delaware
corporation are required to discharge depend upon the specific context that
gives occasion to the board's exercise of its business judgment."54 In the
context of a proposed sale of a corporation at the behest of the majority
stockholder, the Court posited that, even if a "change in control" is not
anticipated, the board of directors must nonetheless seek to maximize the
value of the minority stockholders' shares:
When a board is presented with the majority shareholder's proposal
to sell the entire corporation to a third party, the ultimate focus on
value maximization is the same as if the board itself had decided to
sell the corporation to a third party. When the entire sale to a third
party is proposed, negotiated and timed by a majority stockholder,
however, the board cannot realistically seek any alternative because
the majority shareholder has the right to vote its shares in favor of
the third-party transaction it proposed for the board's consideration.
Nevertheless, in such situations, the directors are obliged to make an
informed and deliberate judgment, in good faith, about whether the
sale to a third party that is being proposed by the majority
shareholder will result in a maximization of value for the minority
shareholders."5
Therefore, the Court continued, even though the ARCO Chemical
directors "did not have the ability to act on an informed basis to secure the best
value reasonably available for all shareholders in any alternative to the third-
party transaction with Lyondell that ARCO had negotiated," they
nonetheless had "the duty to act on an informed basis to independently
ascertain how the merger consideration being offered in the third party
transaction with Lyondell compared to Chemical's value as a going
concern. " " The ARCO Chemical directors were required to fulfill this duty
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to make an informed decision about whether to accept the Lyondell
transaction tender offer price or to seek an appraisal of their shares. 57
The Court found that the allegations of the plaintiff's amended
complaint adequately pled claims that the ARCO Chemical directors
breached their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in considering and
approving the sale to Lyondell proposed by ARCO.
In In re Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the Court of Chancery
considered a motion by minority stockholders of Digex, Inc. ("Digex") to
preliminarily enjoin a proposed merger between WorldCom, Inc.
("WorldCom") and Intermedia Communications, Inc. ("Intermedia"), the
controlling stockholder of Digex.ss In July 2000, Intermedia publicly
announced that it had retained an investment bank to explore its strategic
alternatives concerning its majority-owned subsidiary Digex, including the
possible sale of Intermedia's ownership position in Digex to another
company. After various offers for the acquisition of Digex were received,
Intermedia ultimately agreed to be acquired by WorldCom, with the public
minority stockholders of Digex remaining as such. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs alleged: 1) that the defendants usurped a corporate opportunity that
rightfully belonged to Digex by preventing Digex's sale to the highest bidder,
and 2) that in the face of the three disinterested Digex directors (including
the two members of the special committee formed by Digex in connection
with Intermedia's decision to explore its strategic alternatives) voting against
the waiver of the protections afforded to Digex by 8 Del. C. Section 203
("Section 203"), the four interested Digex board members breached their
fiduciary duties when they voted to waive such protections.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' corporate opportunity claim, finding
that Digex did not have a legally cognizable interest or expectancy in a
WorldCom-Digex deal, as opposed to the ultimate WorldCom-Intermedia
structure. While the plaintiffs argued that the defendants, by allegedly
steering WorldCom away from a deal with Digex and toward a deal with
Intermedia, misappropriated an opportunity belonging to Digex, the Court
found that the opportunity identified by plaintiffs - i.e., the right to sell Digex
to the highest bidder - rightfully belonged not to Digex, but rather to its
stockholders. Moreover, because Intermedia could lawfully vote its majority
holdings to block any proposed sale of Digex, the Court found it unlikely
that Digex and its shareholders would have a legally cognizable interest or
expectancy in a WorldCom-Digex transaction. The Court found further
that, based on the evidentiary record before it, the plaintiffs had not
57 Id.
58 In re Digex, Inc. S'holder Litig., Consol. CA. No. 18336, Chandler, C. (Del. Ch. Dec. 13,
2000).
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demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claim
that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty in allegedly
usurping the corporate opportunity.
In reviewing the Section 203 claim, the Court strongly suggested, but
ultimately did not decide on ripeness grounds, that in calculating the 85% of
the voting stock of the corporation for purposes of determining the
applicability of the Section 203(a)(2) exception to the restrictions on business
combinations, the Delaware General Assembly had intended the exception
to apply to shares of stock and not the voting power of stock.
The Court also addressed the conduct of four directors of the subsidiary
corporation who had been appointed by the parent and who voted for the
waiver. The Court described the decision before the board: "[T]he decision
put before the Digex board was simply whether or not to grant WorldCom
the Section 203 waiver. That is, was whatever Digex was being offered for this
waiver worth the granting of the waiver and could Digex negotiate for more?" 9 The
Court chastised the directors for failing to discuss the subject of the waiver
before taking action to decide whether to approve it, even in the face of
conflicting advice from counsel to the Company and counsel to the special
committee of the Board relating to the appropriateness of voting by
interested board members. Citing Smith v. Van Gorkom,6° the Court
expressed doubt that the directors' conduct in voting to waive the protections
of Section 203 "could even pass the most deferential business judgment
review."
61
In addition to its analysis of the Section 203 claim, the Court also had
occasion to examine the work of the special committee of the Digex board
formed to address the conflicts inherent in the transaction. While not at all
critical of the special committee, the Court made clear that because the
special committee was not afforded legal authority to block the transaction,
or to determine whether or not to grant the Section 203 waiver, it was legally
unable to stop the apparent breach of duty of the interested directors, and
therefore did not cause any burden-shifting effect in the transaction. In
commenting on the failure to structure the committee in a meaningful way,
or to allow it to assume active control of the decision, the Court wrote:
The Section 203 waiver negotiation, however, is exactly where the
Special Committee should have been most relevant in this whole
process. But this is precisely the point at which the Special
Committee is missing in action - not through any failure of its own,
59 Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
60 Smith v. Van Gorkham, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
61 Digex, Consol. C.A. No. 18336, at 75.
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but as a result of the control by the conflicted directors over the
process. Weinberger's suggestion of either an "independent
negotiating structure" or "total abstention" is not to be taken
lightly.... [T]here is a strong role under Delaware law for
meaningful independent director committees. Although this Special
Committee may have been created with precisely this role in mind,
it certainly was not permitted to act in keeping with this role.62
While the Digex Court ultimately denied the request for a preliminary
injunction stopping the Intermedia-WoridCom merger because the Section
203 claim was based on a past decision of the Digex Board, rather than
prospective harm, the Court concluded that "[i]n the wake of this Opinion,
the defendants' choice becomes whether they will proceed with a
WorldCom-Intermedia merger knowing that this Court seriously questions
the integrity of the Section 203 waiver decision and knowing that certain of
the defendant fiduciaries stand accused of faithless acts that under the
stringent standard of the entire fairness test, could well give rise to a range of
equitable remedies, including monetary remedies."
63
VII. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLANS
Recently, the Court of Chancery has reaffirmed the validity of poison pill
rights plans.
In Leonard Loventhal Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., the Court of Chancery
dismissed a complaint filed by a stockholder of Hilton Hotels Corp.
challenging a stockholder rights plan adopted by the Hilton board of
directors in November 1999.64 The Hilton rights plan included provisions
commonly found in many other stockholder rights plans adopted by
Delaware corporations. Nonetheless, the plaintiff challenged the rights plan
on five separate grounds, asserting that: 1) the plan was not a valid and
enforceable contract between Hilton and its common stockholder; 2) the
plan imposed unlawful transfer restrictions on Hilton common stock; 3) the
plan violated 8 Del. C. Sections 151 and 242 by altering the rights of Hilton
stockholders without an amendment to Hilton's certificate of incorporation;
4) Hilton violated 8 Del. C. Section 202, its bylaws and 6 Del. C. Section 8-
401 by failing to issue unlegended stock certificates for shares of common
stock upon request; and 5) the plan violated 8 Del. C. Sections 102(b)(7) and
62 Id. at 71-72.
63 Id. at 88.
64 Leonard Loventhal Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., C.A No. 17803, Chandler C. (Del. Ch.
Oct. 10, 2000).
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141(a) by attempting to eliminate any liability on the part of Hilton's board
of directors. In doing so, the plaintiff "challenged several provisions and
aspects of the Hilton rights plan that were not only contained in the
Household rights plan, but figured prominently in the litigation that led to
the decisions of the Delaware courts."'
With respect to plaintiff's first three claims, the Court dismissed each
under the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court further held that Hilton did not
violate its bylaws or Delaware law by failing to issue unlegended stock
certificates because the legend was authorized by 8 Del. C. Section 157, was
validly approved by the Hilton board, was appropriate as it continued to
evidence the validly issued rights, and did not constitute a refusal to register
a transfer. Finally, the Court dismissed as moot the plaintiffs claim that the
rights plan, which provided that any actions taken in good faith by the Hilton
directors in administering the plan "shall... not subject the Board to any
liability to the holders of the Rights," improperly limited the liability of the
Hilton directors for breaches of fiduciary duty. The Court's holding,
however, was based on Hilton's representation that the provision in question
had no effect on the rights of Hilton's stockholders, qua stockholders, and did
not bar claims that may be brought by stockholders as such concerning the
rights plan. Accordingly, the Court explicitly qualified its dismissal to
recognize that the rights plan "affects neither the rights of the Hilton
shareholders in relation to the Hilton Board nor the duties owed by the
members of the Hilton Board to the Hilton shareholders.
" 66
The Hilton decision currently is on appeal.
VIII. FIDUCIARY DUTY ISSUES
Several important Delaware cases have addressed other aspects of
directors' fiduciary duties, including directors' duties in connection with
mergers, or other extraordinary transactions.
In Nagy v. Bistricer, plaintiff Ernest J. Nagy challenged a merger in which
Riblet Products Corporation ("Riblet") became a wholly owned subsidiary
of Coleman Cable Acquisition ("Coleman"). 6' Nagy was the sole minority
stockholder of Riblet. The co-defendants were the majority stockholders
and sole directors of both Riblet and Coleman. The agreement governing
the Coleman merger contained a unique provision that allowed Coleman to
adjust the merger consideration upward or downward, after closing, based on
consultations with an independent investment bank. Nagy alleged that the
65 Id. at 10.
6 Id. at 28.
67 Nagy v. Bistricer,. CA No. 18017, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch. Nov. 22,2000).
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provision forced the Riblet board to breach its fiduciary duty of care and
constituted an improper abdication of the board's obligation to approve
merger terms that are fair to its stockholders and to make a recommendation
on the merger to its stockholders. He also challenged the disclosures
provided about the merger. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
on various grounds, including that appraisal was the plaintiff's exclusive
remedy. Nagy cross-moved for summary judgment.
In ruling on the parties' motions, the Court first held that Delaware law
now clearly rejects the argument that appraisal can be a stockholder's
exclusive remedy when a stockholder has alleged a colorable claim for breach
of fiduciary duty against a long-form merger. The Court rejected the
defendants' reliance on Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., as establishing that in some
cases, appraisal can be a stockholder's exclusive remedy. 6' The Court
rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss Nagy's disclosure claims and
granted Nagy's motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the
defendants had failed to disclose a series of categories of information, which
resemble the line-item disclosures required by the federal securities laws.
The Court rejected the defendants' argument that Stroud v. Grace,69 provides
for a reduced disclosure obligation in the private company context. Finally,
the Court granted Nagy's motion for summary judgment on his improper
delegation claim, finding that a board of directors has a non-delegable
obligation to determine that the consideration in a long-form merger is fair,
and to make a recommendation to the corporation's stockholders. The
Court rejected the argument that Coleman's failure to alter the initial merger
consideration mooted Nagy's challenge. Dictum in the Court's opinion can
be read to restrict the extent to which a board can approve a merger in which
the price term is dependent upon facts ascertainable outside a merger
agreement, as expressly contefnplated by Section 251 of the General
Corporation Law. The future impact of this dictum remains unclear.
In Strassburger v. Earley,7° plaintiff filed a derivative action arising out of
a share repurchase by nominal defendant Ridgewood Properties of 83% of
its outstanding common stock from two of its largest stockholders. The
plaintiff argued that the Ridgewood directors breached their fiduciary duties
to Ridgewood's minority public stockholders by effectuating a self-dealing
transaction that was unfair to the minority, improperly expending corporate
funds to repurchase stock to perpetuate control in a single board member,
and wasting corporate assets. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that
Ridgewood's president orchestrated the repurchase to give himself control
68 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
69 Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
M Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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of Ridgewood, which would allow him to retain his position and
compensation package, and also allow him to secure a control premium in
the event that Ridgewood was sold.
In its analysis, the Court of Chancery concluded that the stock
repurchases were in fact entrenchment-motivated. The Court also applied
the entire fairness test, and placed the burden of persuasion on the
defendants, notwithstanding the existence of a single member special
committee, finding that the special committee did not conduct any of the
negotiations, did not consider all relevant information, did not retain
advisers, and, most importantly, did not consider the effect of the
repurchases on the minority stockholders. Although finding the price paid
was entirely fair, the Court found that the transaction was not the result of
fair dealing, and ruled the repurchases invalid. Significantly, the Court held
that partial rescission and rescissory damages were appropriate,
notwithstanding its holding that the price paid was fair. Further, the Court
noted that rescissory damages might only be recovered for a breach of the
duty of loyalty. Accordingly, the Court explained that an individual
director's liability for rescissory damages would depend upon his or her
individual culpability. The Court found that three directors had violated
their duty of loyalty and therefore were liable for rescissory damages,
including two directors who had not acted intentionally or in bad faith, but
had subordinated the interests of the minority stockholders to Ridgewood's
majority shareholder.
In Andra v Blount, Meadowcraft's 73% owner, director, chair, and chief
operating officer, Mr. Blount, acting through an acquisition vehicle,
instituted a tender offer to purchase the company's remaining shares.7 In
addition to the tender offer, Blount announced an intention to cash-out
those stockholders who did not tender their shares in the tender offer. Given
his ownership interest in the company, Blount already possessed the votes
needed to effectuate the back-end merger once it had been approved by the
board of directors and presented to the stockholders for their approval.
Following the announcement of the tender offer and back-end merger,
Andra, a stockholder of the company, instituted an action challenging the
disclosures made in connection with the tender offer.
Andra brought the case on an expedited basis, seeking to enjoin the
consummation of the tender offer until a time when the minority.
stockholders had been provided with adequate disclosures. This motion to
enjoin, however, was subsequently withdrawn. The plaintiff explained her
reasoning in withdrawing the motion, stating that a damage award after a full
71 Andra v. Blount, CA No. 17154, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2000).
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trial would provide her with an adequate remedy. More specifically, the
plaintiff explained, via her attorney, that "[i]f plaintiff prevails at trial,
damages could be awarded which would be equivalent to the appraised value
ofMeadowcraft stock thereby giving the shareholders complete relief for the
wrongs complained of in this action." The tender offer was subsequently
consummated. Andra refused to relinquish her shares in either the tender
offer or back-end merger, choosing instead to preserve her appraisal rights.
However, Andra never instituted an appraisal action, but subsequently filed
an amended complaint asserting the defendants had breached their fiduciary
duties of loyalty and due care in failing to disclose all material facts
surrounding the tender offer, and in instituting the tender offer/back-end
merger on terms unfair to the minority stockholders. The defendants moved
to dismiss Andra's claims, arguing that she lacked standing to challenge the
disclosures made in connection with the merger and that, in any event, she
should be relegated to the exclusive remedy of appraisal in challenging the
price of the back-end merger.
The Court first addressed the standing issue with respect to Andra's
disclosure allegations. Andra's disclosure claims were premised on the
theory that the minority stockholders suffered injury from inadequate
disclosures in connection with the tender offer/back-end merger, because
they induced stockholders to tender their shares pursuant to the tender offer
and forego their right to appraisal. The defendants challenged Andra's
standing to bring this claim, arguing that she had not suffered any injury, as
she had in fact exercised her appraisal rights. The Court agreed with this
argument, noting that to hold otherwise would discourage stockholders from
bringing their disclosure claims "at a time when such claims can still be used
to promote a genuinely free stockholder choice.- before the vote."
Turning to the defendants' exclusivity of appraisal argument, the Court
began by notingthat "[i]n the wake ofRabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.
and [Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.], it has become nearly impossible for a
judge of this court to dismiss a well-pled unfair dealing claim on the basis
that appraisal is available as a remedy and is fully adequate."72 This case
presented a unique factual situation, however, in that the plaintiff expressly
agreed that damages equivalent to the appraised value of her stock would
serve as a complete remedy for the wrongs alleged in her complaint. The
Court even acknowledged that all of the fiduciary breaches alleged in the
plaintiff's complaint ultimately related to issues of fair value. Despite this
finding, the Court held that a plaintiff in Andra's situation should not be
relegated to the implicitly less adequate remedy of appraisal, due to the
7 Id. at 23 (citations omitted).
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unavailability of certain "Litigation-Cost Benefits" in an appraisal action-
namely the ability to bring a class action and fee shifting. By way of further
explanation, the Court stated that in an unfair dealing action, a class action
may be brought where attorneys' fees and expenses will be taken against any
class-wide recovery, whereas in an appraisal action, fees and expenses may
only be offset against the appraisal award, which is usually allocated to the
much smaller group of plaintiffs who actually asserted their appraisal rights.
Based on these Litigation-Cost Benefits, the Court concluded that a plaintiff
would not be limited to an appraisal of his shares where that plaintiff has set
forth a well-pled unfair dealing claim.
The full implications of the Court's decision inAndra remain to be seen.
One possibility was the creation of a per se rule in the context of long-form
mergers under Section 251. As stated in the opinion:
[I]f the unavailability of a class action and an attorneys' fee award
renders appraisal an inadequate remedy for a plaintiff such as Andra
who concedes that a fair value award is otherwise sufficient, that
would create a clear per se rule that every well-pleaded claim that a
merger is unfair as a result of fiduciary breaches may proceed on an
equitable, non-statutory basis, alongside any appraisal action. Put
another way, if Andra may press an unfair dealing claim in this
context, then any plaintiff with appraisal rights may also.73
In In re Unocal Exploration Corporation Shareholders Litigation, Unocal
Corporation indirectly held 96% of the common stockin Unocal Exploration
Corporation ("UXC").74 In February 1992, Unocal announced its intention
to effectuate a short-form merger pursuant to Section 253, whereby the
minority shares of UXC stock would be exchanged for stock in Unocal.
Two UXC stockholders filed suit naming Unocal, UXC and UXC's board
of directors as defendants. The plaintiffs alleged entire fairness claims,
attacking both the fair dealing and fair price of the merger transaction. The
plaintiffs' claims focused on, among other things, the independence of UXC
directors on a special committee formed to represent the interests of the
minority stockholders, the reliance by that committee on certain opinions
issued by Paine Webber, the scope of the committee's investigation, the price
received by the stockholders for their shares, and the disclosures made in the
information statement regarding the merger. The defendants argued, among
73 Id. at 25.
74 In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S'holder Litig., CA No. 12453, Lamb, V.C. (Del. Ch. June
13, 2000).
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other things, that plaintiffs' exclusive remedy was appraisal, as the entire
fairness test did not apply to mergers effected pursuant to Section 253.
After exploring the history of the exclusivity argument, the Court
ultimately agreed that the merger at issue should not be examined under this
heightened level of scrutiny. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court held
that the principles set forth in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., and Braasch v.
Goldschmidt, were still good law.7s These cases collectively held that appraisal
is the sole remedy available to a minority stockholder whose investment was
eliminated in a short-form merger, absent a showing of illegality or fraud.
The Court also gave a significant amount of weight to the purpose behind
Section 253, namely to provide a parent corporation with a means to
eliminate the minority interest in a subsidiary. The Court discussed how
this purpose was both inconsistent with, and undermined by, the application
of a heightened judicial standard of review. Accordingly, the Court stated
that a different standard should apply to a long-form merger with a
controlling stockholder that requires both fair dealing and fair price and a
short-form merger, which does not require any dealing. Simply put, the
Court found the application of the heightened standard under the entire
fairness test inconsistent with the unilateral procedure created by the
legislature under Section 253. In light of the fact that plaintiff had not shown
illegality or fraud, the Court entered judgment for the defendants.
The case is currently being appealed.
IX FINALITY OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
In negotiating the terms of a settlement of a class action challenging a
merger, the parties often include language releasing both federal and state
claims. A recent case from the Court of Chancery involved an attempt by
stockholder plaintiffs to vacate a settlement order and finaljudgment entered
over seven years ago.76 The MCA case arose out of the tender offer made by
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Company for MCA, Inc. MCA stockholders
first challenged the transaction by filing an action in the Delaware Court of
Chancery. Not long thereafter, a second purported class action was brought
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
The Delaware action was eventually settled and the final order which was
entered released both state and federal claims related to the underlying
transaction except as to those asserted by stockholders who had opted out of
75 Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199
A.2d 760 (Del. Ch. 1964).
76 See In re MCA, Inc. S'holder Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 11740, Chandler, C. (Del. Ch. Aug. 4,
2000).
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the Delaware settlement. Subsequently, the California plaintiffs, who had
not opted out, asserted in the California District Court that a state court
lacked the authority to approve a release which purported to encompass
claims which were exclusively federal in nature. The California case
eventually resulted in multiple Ninth Circuit decisions, and two appeals to
the United States Supreme Court. However, the ultimate result of the
California litigation was that the Delaware final judgment was held to be
entitled to be given full faith and credit by the California District Court.
Several weeks after the United States Supreme Court denied the California
plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari, the plaintiffs filed a motion to
intervene and vacate the 1993 order and judgment entered by the Delaware
court.
On August 4, 2000, the Court of Chancery issued a decision denying the
motion to intervene and vacate judgment. The Court concluded the
petitioners chose not to avail themselves in 1993 of the opportunity either to
object to the settlement at the Court of Chancery level, or to seek
intervention and Rule 60(b) relief after the Delaware Supreme Court had
affirmed the decision approving the settlement. The Court concluded, in
light of the fact that petitioners had chosen for "purely strategic reasons, to
pursue a collateral attack in federal court," the Court would "refuse to
countenance a belatedly filed motion borne out of a desire to litigate
elsewhere.""n
The case is currently on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.
X CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
Two recent decisions have helped to further define the corporate
opportunity doctrine.
In Kohls v. Duthie, the Court of Chancery declined to dismiss a complaint
which alleged that the directors of Kenetech Corporation ("Kenetech") had
breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the purchase by the
president and CEO of 12.8 million shares of the company's stock for
$1,000.78 Kenetech's president had been advised by the largest holder of the
company's common stock that it was shopping its interest in the company,
and asked him if he would be interested in purchasing the stock if another
buyer could not be found. The complaint alleged that the other members of
the board of directors were also made aware of this possible opportunity, but
did not choose to pursue it on behalf of the company. After the stockholder
77 Id. at 12.
78 Kohls v. Duthie, C.A. No. 17762, Lamb, V.C. (Del. Ch. July 26,2000).
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could not find another buyer for the stock, the president purchased the
shares for $1,000. The plaintiffs filed a derivative action alleging that the
president usurped the opportunity of the company to purchase the shares,
claiming that the 12.8 million shares had been worth more than $1,000 when
purchased, and were presently valued at over $8 million.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim,
and failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 23.1 of the Rules of the
Court of Chancery. In analyzing the Rule 23.1 motion, the Court concluded
that based upon the allegations of the complaint, there was no business
decision that had been made by the Kenetech board of directors regarding the
purchase of the stock. As a result, the Court followed the Delaware Supreme
Court's reasoning in the case of Rales v. Blasband, in which the Court found
absent a business decision having been made by the board, the appropriate
question is: "[Wihether or not the particularized factual allegations of a
derivative stockholder complaint create a reasonable doubt that, as of the
time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly
exercised its independent and disinterested businessjudgment in responding
to a demand."79
It was uncontested that two of the four members of the Kenetech board
were capable of impartially considering a demand, while the president had
mixed feelings from doing so. In analyzing the question with respect to the
remaining director, the Court concluded that given that "the complaint
alleges the forfeiture or usurpation of an opportunity for the corporation to
realize a substantial windfall for the benefit of its stockholders," the
allegations of the complaint, if true, would establish that the fourth director
faced a substantial likelihood of personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty
and aiding and abetting liability, and thus was not disinterested for the
purposes of considering a potential demand. 0
In addressing the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court
concluded that the allegations of the complaint, if true, would state a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty as a result of the plaintiffs' allegations that the
president had usurped a corporate opportunity. In so concluding, the Court
rejected the argument by the defendants that the company had no expectancy
in the alleged opportunity. Defendants also argued that Section 160(a)(1) of
the General Corporation Law prohibited the company from repurchasing its
shares, as a result of the fact that Kenetech's capital was impaired in the
approximate amount of $131 million on a balance sheet basis. The Court
concluded that because Delaware law permits the revaluation of assets and
79 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,934 (Del. 1993).
8D Kohis, CA No. 17762, at 16, 17.
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liabilities to establish surplus, and because the major asset of the company
was being carried at a low book value at the time of the transaction, Section
160(a)(1) may not have been a barrier to a potential stock repurchase by the
company. Defendants also argued that the company was contractually
restricted from repurchasing its own shares because of its then-current
situation involving default in payment on senior debt. The Court concluded
that it could not dismiss the complaint on this basis because the complaint
alleged the debt holders had already waived their rights in other
circumstances. Consequently, there was reason to believe that the debt
holders would not have objected to the repurchase of the block of stock.
Similarly, the defendants argued that because of the arrearages in dividends
on preferred stock, the certificate of designations prohibited any repurchase
of shares. The Court concluded that it could not dismiss the complaint on
this basis because no steps had been taken by the company to amend the
charter provision to avoid that barrier. Finally, the Court concluded that
although the complaint did not specifically allege that the president had
become aware of the opportunity to purchase the stock in his official
capacity, it was appropriate to draw such an inference. Thus, the Court
concluded that the complaint stated a claim against the president for
usurpation of a corporate opportunity and a claim against the other
defendants for breach of fiduciary duty for knowing acquiescence in the
alleged usurpation, and failure to take steps to protect the company's interest
in purchasing the shares itself
In KohIs v. Duthie, ("Kohls II"), the Court of Chancery denied a motion




Prior to the announcement of the transaction at issue, plaintiffs filed a
derivative action against Kenetech and certain of its present and former
directors alleging that Mark D. Lerdal, the president and chief executive
officer and a director of Kenetech, usurped a corporate opportunity by
purchasing approximately one-third of the outstanding shares of Kenetech
common stock for $1,000. During the pendency of the derivative action,
ValueAct Capital Partners, L.P. ("ValueAct") contacted Lerdal about the
possibility of acquiring Kenetech.
After ValueAct suggested the possibility of Lerdal participating in the
acquisition, a special committee of the board was formed. In appointing the
special committee, the board determined that. it would not approve any
transaction without a prior favorable recommendation of the special
committee. The special committee was comprised of Charles Christenson,
SI Kohis v. Duthie, CA. No. 17762, Lamb, V.C. (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2000).
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a defendant in the underlying derivative action, and Gerald R. Morgan, Jr.,
a personal friend of Lerdal and the chief operating officer of a $1.3 billion
fund in which Kenetech agreed to invest $5 million over a six-year period.
After months of negotiations, ValueAct and Kenetech reached an
agreement whereby ValueAct would acquire Kenetech by means of a tender
offer for all the outstanding shares of Kenetech at a price of $1.04 per share
in cash, followed by a back-end merger at the same consideration. The
tender offer was conditioned on, among other things, the valid tender of at
least 85% of the Kenetech shares not owned by Lerdal.
Following the announcement of the proposed transaction, the plaintiffs
amended their complaint in the derivative action to assert class claims
alleging, among other things, that the terms of the proposed tender offer and
merger were not entirely fair. The plaintiffs' main line of attack against the
transaction was that the consideration was inadequate in light of the
derivative action, and that the disclosures with respect to its value were
inadequate as well. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not satisfy any of
the requisite elements for preliminary injunctive relief.
First, the Court held the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable probability
of success on the merits of their challenge to the transaction. The Court
based this conclusion on the finding it was likely the evidence regarding the
existence and functioning of the special committee, would result in the
application of the business judgment rule. The Court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that Christenson was interested in the transaction because the merger
would eliminate his exposure to personal liability in the derivative action.
The Court noted that the record in the action contained clear evidence of the
weakness of the corporate opportunity claim. In particular, the Court noted
that seller of shares that Mr. Lerdal purchased testified he did not offer, and
would not have offered, to sell the shares to Kenetech. Accordingly,
Kenetech was unable to take advantage of the alleged opportunity. The
Court also found the likely remedy to the plaintiffs, if the derivative claim
were ultimately successful, would be cancellation of Lerdal's shares, not
money damages assessed against the directors. The Court also rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that Morgan's personal relationship with Lerdal, and the fact
that Kenetech invested in Morgan's fund, rendered Morgan interested or
compromised his independence. Moreover, the Court noted the evidence
indicated the special committee engaged in vigorous arm's-length
negotiations.
Second, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not establish the requisite
irreparable harm, stating "loss of standing to bring a derivative action is not
irreparable harm," due in part to the fact that the derivative claim could be
valued in a subsequent appraisal action.
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Finally, the Court determined the balance of the hardships tipped in
defendants' favor. The Court found if the proposed transaction were
enjoined, Kenetech's stockholders could suffer real injury because there was
no alternative to the proposed transaction. The Court concluded "[i]n light
of the full disclosures made by the corporation, as well as protective
mechanisms of the 85 percent Minimum Tender Condition, I see no reason
... why shareholders should not be the final authority on whether this cash-
out transaction takes place."
XI. ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN ADVISING BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
A. Assertions of the Attorney-Client or Business Strategy Privileges May
Impact Presentation of Defense in Takeover Cases
Two decisions have highlighted the consequences that may flow from
the tactical decision to assert the attorney-client, or business strategy
privileges, to bar inquiry into the nature and substance of the board's
deliberations, particularly in cases governed by the heightened scrutiny of
Unocal and its progeny, in which the board bears the burden ofjustifying its
actions. These cases reveal the importance of carefully considering privilege
issues early in, or even before, litigation arising from corporate control
contests.
The battle for control of Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. was well
publicized for its invalidation of no-hand poison pills in Delaware.82 Perhaps
less well publicized, but equally important, is an interim ruling in that case
by the Court of Chancery that reveals certain risks involved in the assertion
of the attorney-client privilege in the context of takeover litigation.
The Quickturn litigation involved a challenge to certain defensive
measures adopted by the board of directors of Quickturn, in response to an
unsolicited tender offer made by Mentor Graphics Corporation. This
included the amendment of bylaws to encompass an advance notice
provision, and the amendment of Quickturn's poison pill rights plan to
include a deferred redemption provision. During the course of expedited
discovery, Mentor specifically targeted the board's reasons for adopting these
defensive measures. Throughout discovery, Quickturn repeatedly asserted
the attorney-client privilege to bar inquiry into the board's deliberations
regarding these measures, and Quickturn's counsel, in asserting these
objections, repeatedly stated that the board's deliberations with regard to the
8 See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
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defensive measures only took place with counsel and that all such
deliberations were shielded from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.
Concerned that Quickturn would attempt to introduce evidence at trial
regarding the board's deliberations despite having blocked inquiry into these
matters in discovery, Mentor filed a motion in limine to preclude Quickturn
from introducing, or referring to, any evidence regarding the existence or
substance of any communication among the board and its legal advisors. The
Court of Chancery ruled on the motion in limine on the third day of trial.
Although technically denying the motion, the Court ruled that "the plaintiffs
are entitled to some preclus[ive] relief, but relief of a more limited kind, not
as a consequence of the motion but as a consequence of the position
defendants have taken during discovery." Specifically, Vice ChancellorJacobs
ruled as follows:
By blocking discovery into these subjects, the defendants have, as a
legal and evidentiary matter, thereby precluded themselves from
arguing or placing into evidence the content of the legal advice they
received or of the collective deliberations into which discovery was
blocked. It must be emphasized that under Unocal and Unitrin the
defendants have the burden of showing the reasonableness of their
investigation, the reasonableness of their process and also of the
result they reached. One would think that a board having that
burden would want to expose their deliberative process to full view,
but they are not legally required to do so.
The defendants are the masters of the evidence they will present
in their defense, but they must accept the consequences of their
tactical choice. Here the defendants' tactical decision to bar on
privileg[e] grounds discovery into what the board was advised was
their fiduciary duty, and into the content of the board's deliberations,
will in turn preclude them from proving those deliberations at trial
to defend their position that their decision was reasonable and made
with due care. 3
As a consequence of this ruling, Mentor was in a position to argue, post-
trial, that the Quickturn directors could not meet their burden under Unocal
and its progeny, to demonstrate that they identified a threat to corporate
policy and effectiveness in good faith and after reasonable investigation, or
that the defensive response they selected was not preclusive, not coercive and
83 Id.
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fell within a range of reasonableness. The trial court ultimately invalidated
the defensive measures without addressing Mentor's arguments based on the
evidence preclusion order. However, the evidence preclusion ruling in
Quickturn is significant because it highlights that defendants face a tactical
choice in deciding whether or not to assert the attorney-client privilege to bar
inquiry into the deliberations of the board in cases where they bear the
burden ofdemonstrating the reasonableness ofthe board's decision. Further,
it may suggest the importance of structuring board deliberations to ensure
that some nonprivileged deliberations may be disclosed in discovery, and at
trial, to meet the board's burden of proof, without waiving the privilege.
A similar ruling, applying the evidence preclusion principle to assertions
of the business strategy privilege, was made by the Court of Chancery in the
post-trial opinion in Chesapeake Corporation v. Shore.'
In Chesapeake, the Court of Chancery noted that Shorewood's assertion
of the attorney-client and business strategy privileges had "limited [the
Court's] ability to determine the course of events as precisely as [the Court]
would have liked.""5 In particular, the Court noted that "the Shorewood
board has invoked the business strategy and attorney-client privileges
whenever it could do so. As a result, virtually all of the professional advice
given to the Shorewood board has been kept from Chesapeake and its
counsel - and thus the court."86 The Court found, however, that having so
limited the inquiry of the plaintiff, defendants had improperly also
"attempted to use some of this concealed advice as a sword," by, for example,
attempting to "establish that they have hired reputable investment bankers
to look at strategic alternatives. '87  Further, the Court found, that the
defendants had "refused to allow Chesapeake to inquire even as to the basic
nature of such alternatives."
88
Relying upon the evidence preclusion ruling in Quickturn, the Court of
Chancery held that the only fair way to proceed is not to give any weight to
any advice of this nature, or to the defendants' supposed search for
alternatives. The potential for abuse is simply too great. For example, the
defendants could be looking only at strategic alternatives that involve the
continuation in office of Shorewood's management. Having denied
Chesapeake and the court any opportunity to determine whether this is so,
the defendants cannot use their hiring of advisors as evidence that they are
willing to sell Shorewood at the right price, to a party who intends to replace
84 Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, CA. No 17626, Strine, V.C. (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2000).
es Id. at 11.
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87 Id. at 12-13.
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the Shorewood board and management. To allow the defendants to do so
would be inequitable.8 9
Ultimately, the Court in Chesapeake struck down the challenged
defensive measures, finding that the board had not met its burden of
demonstrating the reasonableness of its investigation, or of the defensive
measures themselves. While it is difficult to gauge just how significant the
evidentiary point was to the ultimate decision, the Court's focus upon the
evidentiary issue in its opinion demonstrates that the effect was, at least, not
de minimis.
B. Corporate Counsel Performing Multiple Roles Bears Burden of Establishing
the Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege
In Grimes v. LCC International, Inc, the Court of Chancery was asked to
resolve a motion to compel production of documents withheld based on the
attorney-client privilege and/or work-product immunity.9° The underlying
case involved allegations by the minority stockholders of Microcell
Management, Inc., a majority-owned subsidiary of LCC International, Inc.,
that LCC had failed, in violation of its contractual and fiduciary duties, to
provide adequate financial assistance to Microcell. At issue on the motion to
compel were 140 documents created or reviewed by "corporate counsel,"
Peter DeLiso, who served in at least three different capacities: as general
counsel for LCC, as general counsel for Microcell and as a director (and later
chairman of the board) of Microcell.
The Court of Chancery referred the matter to a special discovery master,
but issued a letter ruling providing guidance to the special master. In
essence, the Court of Chancery gave the special master direction with regard
to four categories of documents. First, documents reviewed or created by
DeLiso solely as a director would not be protected by the attorney-client
privilege (unless they contained legal advice to the board or DeLiso qua
client). Second, documents relating solely to DeLiso's status as general
counsel of LCC would be privileged, and further would not be subject to a
"good cause" exception to the privilege, since plaintiffs were stockholders of
Microcell, not LCC. Third, documents relating solely to DeLiso's capacity
as general counsel of Microcell would be privileged, but the privilege could
be overcome by a showing of "good cause." Most importantly, as to the
fourth category of documents, consisting of all documents "that do not
disclose in a clear-cut way which of Mr. DeLiso's three hats he was wearing
89 Id.
90 Grimes v. LCC Intl., C.A. No. 16957,Jacobs, V.C. (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 1999).
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at the time he generated or received the communication in question," the
Court held that "any doubt about the status of this 'indeterminate' category
of documents should be resolved against the claim of privilege."9' As the
Court explained:
[I]t was the defendants who would have created the problem, by
placing Mr. DeLiso in multiple - and potentially conflicting -
fiduciary roles. Having created that conflict and its resulting
ambiguity, and having been in a position to prevent the conflict from
arising in the first place, the defendants, as fiduciaries for Microcell's
minority stockholders, cannot be allowed to benefit from the
ambiguity by asserting a privilege that might not otherwise have been
available. 9
2
This decision highlights the risks inherent in having corporate counsel
perform multiple functions within the corporate family, and the importance
of clearly establishing under which role the corporate counsel is acting.
91 Id. at 6.
92 Id. at 6-7.
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